Encounters between economic theory and other social sciences have come to be characterized by debates about the respective claims to truth, truthfulness, and authority that can be derived from different disciplinary methodologies. With the advance of quantitative statistics and mathematics-based reasoning, the economics profession has advanced claims of universal validity which allegedly rank the discipline first and foremost among the social sciences.

A related development has been the “colonization” of other fields of the social sciences by economic methods. As a consequence, many scholars in disciplines such as politics and sociology have become either awed or wary of economic theory and methodology. In these—and many other—disciplines, there has also been a turn away from attempts at generalization and an increasing focus on the particular, the local, and the historically distinct.

But a growing minority of social scientists has also been engaged in critical reflection within and across disciplines. These efforts center on reflexive analysis of the extra-disciplinary contexts for the production of knowledge, and the advantages and limits of different disciplinary methods. While IPS has published many examples of “international political sociologists” constructing such pathways among the disciplines, little attention has been paid to those economists who might be following a similar trace. Yet the number of economists developing links across disciplines has been growing, with interesting and important results. We therefore find it appropriate to begin the IPS interview series with Malaysian economist Jomo Kwame Sundaram, who has been a pioneer in this endeavor.

Jomo has developed a form of economic thinking that steers clear of excessive abstraction and formalization, as well as the universalizing pretensions that tend to accompany those techniques—without giving up on the idea that economic reasoning has important contributions to make toward the solving of critical problems. He has done so in a publicly engaged fashion, first from his position as an activist academic in Malaysia, and later as a senior UN official engaging with a broad array of political, policy, and practical issues. One result of this broad engagement is a publication record which spans theoretical debates and practical policy questions on issues ranging from alternative conceptions of (development) economics to fishing in Malaysia, as well as topics such as ethnicity, class relations,
gender, and economic governance. This multifaceted body of work is held together by a focus on alternative policy visions and instruments for addressing social problems that, if considered at all, have been marginalized by the institutional, political, and cultural dominance of particular forms of thinking about economic policy and, in recent times, “neoliberalism.”

There are, Jomo has argued, deep-seated modes of comprehension, and very strong institutions backing them up, which tend to propel us toward understanding problems in a particular way, and also to address them in particular ways (Jomo and Chowdhury 2011, 2012). Taking the time to stand back and reframe problems in a way that brings a rich historical and sociological perspective, Jomo’s body of work argues that how we frame social problems is a key constraint on the kinds of solutions we allow, and reflects hegemonic interests that are seldom recognized or subjected to critical review (Jomo 2005b; Jomo and Reinert 2005).

In the interview, we try to bring this out by asking Jomo to develop his views on three issues: the social production of economic knowledge; the interaction of the global and the local in the re-production of knowledge; and his critique of neoliberalism. As you will see, Jomo responds by developing themes that are indeed core to IPS, including the fetishization of expertise, the performativity of numbers and categories, the role of hegemony and imperialism in shaping economic thought, the impossibilities of universal general theories, and the potential value as well as limits of alternative forms of economic reasoning, such as Islamic economic theorizing. The interview concludes on a reflexive note, considering the role of public intellectuals and assessing Malaysia’s political prospects. 

Anna: We’re honored that you’re taking the time to do this with us. We’ll try to cover issues we think are most interesting to the audience of international political sociology. We’ll try to go through several themes—the social production of economic knowledge, the way that the global and local interact in this, and your critique of neoliberalism. Ending on a reflexive note, we will ask you to look back on your work. I hope that’s okay?

Jomo: Thank you. Yes, I think so. You’ll have to prompt me. That sounds like a very big agenda. After working for almost eight years as an international bureaucrat, I’m not sure I’m up to date on all these theoretical issues. But I do see their relevance for my work.

Anna: We’ve been very interested in various facets of your critique of the way that knowledge is produced. You’ve been very critical of the way that there has been a move toward the dominance of expertise in economic knowledge. You recently edited a book—Poor Poverty (Jomo and Chowdhury 2011)—which explored the impoverishment of analysis and measurement in poverty policy, so I wonder if you could start by explaining the core problem with this form of “expertization”?

Jomo: Well, I think there are two slightly different but related issues. One is the whole question of knowledge and the organization of knowledge as it has evolved

---

over time. The tendency has been to reify so-called disciplines, and to give significance to the segregation of these disciplines which is unwarranted: in a sense, you’re building one fiction upon another fiction and this, I think, is especially problematic. Having said that, there is the secondary problem of the fetishization of expert knowledge and related to that, of course, other problems, including the issue of technocratic arrogance. So, these are different sets of issues.

You mention in particular Poor Poverty, but I would actually also refer you to something else which I did with Anis Chowdhury called: Is Good Governance Good for Development? (Jomo and Chowdhury 2012). In a sense, the two books are somewhat related, but they deal with different problematics—that is, different conceptual frameworks that have been developed to define how important development issues should be understood, analyzed, and addressed. I am not sure the question of the fetishization of expertise is especially significant in the case of governance since the recommended technical apparatus of governance is less systematized, but it certainly is a problem with understanding and addressing poverty. In both cases, we show the way in which knowledge is organized, and the way we, in a sense, tend to understand issues through particular lenses, and then privilege those lenses. The consequent perspectives often take on lives of their own, which can be quite problematic.

Let me go back to Poor Poverty. What we have then, for a variety of reasons, is a normative decision to understand poverty as absolute poverty, rather than to see poverty as relative, thus evading the issue of inequality. But one should recognize that this is a normative decision. There is the additional problem of deciding on a particular definition of a “poverty line” for essentially political convenience, but which then acquires a normative significance which is unjustifiable.

Consider the example, two decades ago, of deciding on a dollar-a-day poverty line. Why a dollar a day? Because it’s much more attractive to say that it’s a dollar, than to say it’s a dollar twenty a day, or ninety cents a day. A dollar a day is a deceptively convenient and attractive slogan. But then, we end up with a poverty line that essentially defines the terms of poverty discourse. It is used to justify the particular measures that are chosen to address a far more subtle problem. Although the precise measures used to estimate the poverty line have changed over time, the strange underlying idea that poverty—and therefore also poverty eradication—is reducible to a single measure is never fully acknowledged in the discourse. Even among ostensible experts, the core construct remains unchallenged as it may undermine the legitimacy of the extensive institutional and normative framework that has been elaborated around the dollar-a-day concept. In a similar vein, the periodic adjustment that is made to the poverty line, on the basis of what is called purchasing power parity, is not commensurate with price adjustments relating to the original choice of the poverty line on the items bought by the poor.

Anna: Is this an example of the point you started with—what you would call a fiction, where you build expertise as a fiction, on a fiction?

Jomo: Yes, the first fiction of course is that poverty lends itself to the kind of easy reductionist measurement suggested by the dollar-a-day formula. It’s not the original fiction, but it’s close, and then you build all kinds of other things on it, oblivious to its awkward implications, even when the new assumptions and applications begin to collide with the original rationale. So, in this particular case, the original dollar-a-day line was supposed to be what it cost to take care of one’s very basic needs, mostly food costs.

As the poverty line was defined principally in terms of what it takes to avoid being hungry, the very idea of a single universal poverty line ignores the fact that
what it costs to get that food differs from society to society and, more important, the fact that costs may significantly differ and may change differently over time. At the end of his presidency, Robert Zoellick, then president of the World Bank, was keen to declare victory on what is called MDG1 [Millennium Development Goal One]. In early 2012, he announced that MDG1, the commitment to reduce poverty by half, had actually been achieved by 2010, ahead of schedule, well before the target year of 2015.

At the FAO, where I now work, we recently recalculated the numbers and now think that the number of hungry was going down but not as much as the poverty numbers. So, there clearly is some very serious discrepancy between the poverty and hunger numbers. This observation gets to the heart of what we are measuring and what the numbers actually mean.

The hunger indicator is itself also problematic. Originally, the definition of hunger was not receiving enough calories for a sedentary lifestyle. One would expect that most poor people do not have the choice of a sedentary lifestyle. It seems more reasonable to expect poor people to need dietary energy for a higher level of human activity. Is this very low threshold of consumption consistent with what is required for a meaningful measure of human survival?

There are many other examples, but I think the point is clear. For reasons of convenience, we create fictions, and then declare our satisfaction with progress made in relation to these misleading indicators—indicators that obscure important aspects of poverty.

One more point: There is a rich debate going on today in India over dietary energy, to cite just one example. This reminds us of how most of us professionals are living in worlds which are conveniently insulated or cocooned from the rich and informative debates that are taking place in other parts of the world, but which are obscured from “official” or internationally sanctioned discourse due to the privileging of certain forms of knowledge favored by the North. There are, in fact, many rich debates going on elsewhere. I’ve just mentioned India, but one could also refer to some of the debates going on in Brazil, South Africa, Egypt, and elsewhere.

Prem: I wonder if I could pick up on the points that you made regarding the proliferation of other ways of conceptualizing poverty. It seems to me that these other ways of conceptualizing poverty, while they specifically address the way poverty has been problematized, they are also trying to challenge this broader claim to valid knowledge that, as you say, is coming from the North. I wonder if you could contextualize this alternative problematization of poverty by highlighting other types of economic and political interventions that are made possible. What sort of economic and political policy does it privilege, what sort of policies does it make more likely than others?

Jomo: The short answer is that, insofar as economists tend to dominate this debate, the general presumption is something called a “Pareto optimality requirement”—that is, you cannot, under any circumstances, take from Peter to pay Paul or, to put it more bluntly, you cannot rob the rich to pay the poor. Now, that requirement is violated all the time, whenever you change a tax system or public policy in any way to redirect resources from one section of the population to another. It happens all the time, but we professional economists maintain the fiction that the solutions we are proposing are always Pareto optimal in that they make no one worse off while making others better off.

3A situation is considered “Pareto optimal” when no one can be made better off without making someone else worse off.
We reinforce that fiction by privileging property rights over, say, human rights. The general assumption in much economic thinking is that if you do not want to violate the Pareto requirement, you need growth to “lift all boats.” The common presumption is that economic growth generates the tide that lifts all boats. Thus, economic growth is privileged over all other goals. The possible undermining of human welfare, let alone the sustainability of the planet, that results from certain common forms of growth is increasingly given lip service, but rarely seriously problematized. So, the demand by developing countries that we should have “common, but differentiated responsibility” in dealing with climate or any other similar public policy challenge, is always portrayed as inherently unreasonable or unfair because it suggests that burden sharing should be unequal. Similarly, you have the selective invocation of other particular criteria in public policy discourses.

If I may use a slightly different example, you have discourses which conveniently, but misleadingly and politely, use “rent-seeking” to refer to any hint of corruption or unfair acquisition of income or wealth. To refer to rent-seeking in this way invests academic or technocratic language with normative significance, so that when you want to suggest that a third world elite group is corrupt, you call it rent-seeking.

Yet, any strict and consistent definition of rent-seeking would recognize that in any situation where you do not have the mythical perfect market, the existence of rents is always to be presumed. But that never, or rarely ever, happens. So, in the last two decades or so, the term “rent seeking” has been used selectively to refer to what is normatively deemed inappropriate, rather than used consistently in a rigorous analytical or positive fashion, even by the standards of those who have defined or prompted the use of terms such as “rents” and “rent-seeking.”

Anna: I’d like to connect this last point with your work on neocolonialism (Jomo 2006a,b), or what you like to call imperialism, because the example you just gave has a lot of that aspect in it. You’ve just been discussing cases where certain forms of economic knowledge not only claim to capture reality most accurately and realistically, and hence exclude or depreciate other kinds of knowledge, but also come to be applied very selectively. In particular, I’d like to ask you about the way that you think about hegemony and imperialism as factors controlling the way that knowledge is articulated.

Jomo: May I start with your first point, Anna. It refers to what some people—Ben Fine (Fine and Milonakis 2009), for example—call “economics imperialism.” Actually, I don’t like the term myself because it’s a bit confusing—the term economic imperialism has a variety of very different meanings. By economics imperialism, he refers to the domination or hegemony of economics in what we now call the social sciences, and the consequent tendency, particularly in what is called political science or sociology, to mimic the characteristic methods of economics. Economics, for example, has a school called “rational expectations,” while in politics and sociology this is mimicked by what is called “rational choice.”

In the case of rent-seeking, some economists use rent-seeking rigorously and consistently but others, especially in referring to politics, who are perhaps less familiar with the analytical sense in which the term “rent-seeking” is used, have exploited the currently popular normative interest in corruption by extending the use of terms such as rents and rent-seeking. Hence political scientists, sociologists, and others are now more likely to use the term rent-seeking interchangeably with corruption (Khan and Jomo 2000).
But coming back to your second, main point, my own reason for using the term imperialism is because the original use of the term “imperialism” over a century ago was widely shared—not only by radical, but also by liberal, critics of imperialism. It was not defined principally or exclusively in terms of colonialism, but referred to the great asymmetries in the exercise of power in relations between nation-states, as well as between dominant powers and subject peoples. That is the main reason I choose to use the term. There has been a tendency in the last half century to abandon the term imperialism, simply because the era of colonialism has ended. I think it is a mistake to associate and define imperialism narrowly with colonialism when this was not the intent of the early commentators on imperialism. Remember that the first major critic of imperialism in the twentieth century was John Hobson, who came out of a tradition associated with John Stuart Mill and so on.

A great number of people who have considered themselves to be liberals—in the European economic sense of the term, that is, as opposed to the American political sense of the term—in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, and who traced their liberal values back to the nineteenth century tradition of European liberalism, including English liberalism, forget that their tradition, which contributed greatly to the critique of both imperialism and colonialism, is still relevant today.

Anna: I’d like to come back a little bit to the argument about rent-seeking, because the way you’re linking the critique of imperialism to John Hobson and liberalism resonates with what you had to say about rent-seeking as something mobilized from outside economics for other purposes. You’ve published on economic alternatives, for example on Riba [interest, usury or surplus], and on Islamic thought about economic development (Jomo 1992, 1999). So, do you think that there is an economic science common to all experiences, or are you actually saying there are alternative ways of thinking about economics which are not necessarily anchored in a common, liberal tradition?

Jomo: Let me go back a little bit in order to go forward. You’re absolutely correct, Anna, to link this with rents, because Hobson analyzed the emergence of imperialism and associated it with the emergence of what economists call oligopolies. It was what Mill and Hobson saw as a marked tendency toward concentration in capitalism—used in the liberal, not Marxist, sense—a tendency toward the concentration of capital, resulting in the greater accumulation of wealth and the acquisition of sufficient (oligopolistic) market power to extract unearned profits, which should be called rents. The growing influence of such corporate interests on public policy was, for Hobson, the second factor which led to modern imperialism. So, for Hobson, oligopoly and increased corporate influence on public policy were the two new developments driving modern imperialism (Jomo 2005a). This is the sense in which I have used the term imperialism.

The book on Islamic economic alternatives that you refer to makes several different critiques at the same time, and that may have been a problem. Islamic social thought is basically a challenge to the norms presumed to be the basis for the organization of social life, including economic life. It is not only a reminder that there are other norms, but that the basic norms of society are always contested.

In Islamic discourses, there has been a tendency, in the last half century, to suggest that Islam would be supportive of what is, essentially, a modern market economy with three exceptions. First and most importantly, it was argued that homo islamicus, that is, human beings motivated primarily by different, spiritual considerations, challenged the typical presumption of homo oeconomicus, that is,
the self-seeking optimizing utilitarian individual. I don’t necessarily share either view of the essential nature of human beings, but I think it is important to recognize this critique and assess its implications. Now, of course, it’s not all that unusual to challenge it, particularly with the rise and popularity of what is called behavioral economics. In sociology, people such as George Homans (1958, 1961) and others have long developed the school of behavioralism—quite different from behavioralism in psychology. We have longer traditions outside of economics, but in economics its popularity is more recent. In fact, the first Nobel Prize in the field of behavioral economics was shared by a psychologist at Princeton working in the Economics Department [Daniel Kahneman].

Second, mainstream Islamic economists hold that Islam opposes interest because it is usurious. I actually revised and edited a book by the late Dr. Zia ul Haque (Haque 1995, 2004), who died more than ten years ago. His argument is that one should understand the Islamic rejection of Riba as a critique of exploitation in all its forms, not just of interest.

The third element is the presumption that distribution funded by so-called Islamic public finance measures, particularly zakat [tithes], would be adequate to achieve public policy aims.

All this tradition is still relevant today. But the debate has not been joined, partly because many of the more interesting writers have been Shiites, and the Sunni majority tends to ignore the Shiite contributions. In addition, most of this writing is in languages such as Persian and Arabic, and translations are wanting. Except for very exceptional writings such as Nikki Keddie’s (1983) introduction to al-Afghani’s rejection of imperialism, there isn’t much Western academic writing in this tradition. Similarly, it is unfortunate that we are not better informed about what is called Buddhist economics in places such as Thailand. All we have is Schumacher’s Buddhist Economics, which says some useful and interesting things, but the possibility of contributing to a larger contemporary critique of social and economic life and thinking has unfortunately been missed, which is really quite unfortunate.

Prem: I would like to pick up on some of the things you’ve been saying recently about alternative bases for doing economic policy and understanding economics. You’ve talked recently, and just now, about the way corporate interests and public policy interests have been made to coincide, and you’ve talked about expertization as a way of disguising normative judgments in technocratic language. I wonder if you could reflect on the consequences of both in conceiving of economic crisis, the recent one and also the East Asian crisis a decade earlier?

Jomo: I don’t subscribe to the [idea of a] single theory of crisis. Some, like Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), have written interestingly about nearly a millennium of crises. Charles Kindleberger (1997) wrote a useful book on more recent financial crises, and there are some lessons for the current situation. I have also learnt a great deal from Hyman Minsky (1986), but I find it very difficult to speak of crisis in general terms. Much of Minsky’s discussion is about financial fragility or, rather, the systemic fragility of the financial system. He links his analysis to inherent tendencies in modern economic and financial management which lend themselves to booms and busts. In creating a boom, we sow the seeds for a bust, and in trying to sustain a boom, we create the conditions for a bigger bust. There are important parallels between the 1930s and the current period, but many contemporary features are unique and original and cannot be traced back to the 1930s.

While I have argued that many policy responses deemed heretical during the 1997–1998 Asian crisis should be, and actually have been, utilized in response to
the recent crisis (Jomo 2009a), beyond a certain level of generality—in terms of
the fragility of the system and the tendencies toward excessive exuberance and
pessimism—I’m not sure that one can say that much that is instructive about
parallels between the Asian crisis and the current crisis. And speaking of the cur-
rent crisis, I think it has gone through so many phases, and there are so many
dimensions to it now, that I’m hesitant to draw parallels, not only with Asia, but
even with the 1930s, as I suggested earlier. For example, part of the reason why
Europe has condemned itself to a protracted economic slowdown is because of
the particularities of the special European arrangements, including the Euro
itself. This certainly was not a feature in the past. I don’t think it’s comparable
to the emergence of the Fed at the beginning of the twentieth century. There
was already a US dollar circulating throughout the United States, so I think to
make too much of the introduction of the Euro, and comparing it with the
emergence of the Fed, is not terribly helpful. I’m sure there are other parallels
which I have not mentioned, but I would be very hesitant to make general claims
about crises, let alone financial crises or crises which are financial in origin,
beyond the general observations I’ve made so far.

Anna: That resonates with your writing on the reform of the international finan-
cial system in which you’ve also actively taken part and where you’re very critical
of the pervasiveness of misguided policy advice.4 I’d now like to ask you to
reflect on the capacity of public intellectuals, such as yourself, to actually shape
policy. How can one reform a system, and what’s the role of public intellectuals
in that? From what kind of institutional basis can one actually do that? You’ve
made the choice, I think, to move from the academic to the policy world. You’ve
written about the future of development economics and inspirations from the
past.5 But how do people like you get those ideas into policymaking circles?

Jomo: Frankly, I think it would be very immodest to try to generalize too much
from my personal experience, at least partly because my personal trajectory has
involved an unusual transition, not available to most people. I have tried to
make important critiques of what we do in the international system on the finan-
cial system, poverty, governance, micro-credit, a number of other things which
are in vogue in the international system.6

At the same time, much of this work has been conjunctural, the result more of
accident than planning or preparation. I happened to have been forced into
early retirement just months before being invited to join the UN. I was facing
problems in my old job; I had been sued for 250 million Ringgit (which used to
be about a hundred million dollars) by one of the richest men in my country.
That, in itself, was not a problem. I could have fought the case from Malaysia,
but after surviving six vice-chancellors, I had a particularly personally antago-
nistic Vice-Chancellor who wanted me out of the university. Before that, I had sur-
vived by not having any ambitions within the university system. I did not seek
any position in the university, and precisely because I was un-ambitious in the
usual ways, I was a threat to no one. I was helpful as a colleague to people who
had very different views, and I would like to think I had no real enemies among
my colleagues.

---

4Jomo was a member of the [Stiglitz] Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations General
Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System (Stiglitz et al. 2009). During 2010–2012,
he was G20 Sherpa to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, and also UN G20 Finance Deputy during 2011–2012.
Some statements (both written and spoken) of his views are available on http://www.jomoks.org/.
6See Jomo and Fine 2006a; Jomo 2009b; United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2010.
That was a formula for survival for decades. But survival became impossible to sustain, unfortunately, in 2004. So, I had to seriously start thinking about where to work and how to work. I had to think about my children’s education and so on. And then, happily for me, the G77, the grouping of developing countries at the UN, passed a resolution to create a new job to enhance the quality of research on development at the UN, and I was approached to look for a suitable candidate among the women academics whom I knew. I suggested half a dozen, many of whom were from South Asia, but also some from Southeast Asia, and indicated some others from Latin America. I presumed the matter had been resolved, when I got a phone call asking me to send my own CV. I made a little joke about not being willing to have a sex change operation, but eventually was selected for the position. But that was such an unusual trajectory that I think it’s of no relevance to anybody else.

I have made some very difficult decisions at various stages of my career which have had very mixed consequences. During the 1980s, I published mainly in the national language of my country. My only major publication in English in the 1980s was a revised version of my thesis, and a few other things, but nothing much else in the first decade after I finished my dissertation in 1977 (Jomo 1977). It was only after I took a sabbatical abroad in 1987, and many of my colleagues in Malaysia were arrested, that I felt the need to start publishing in English to reach out. Even then, I continued to write only on my country, and only later on the Southeast Asian region. I did not feel a great need or desire to go beyond that, and it was only much later, almost a decade later, with the Asian crisis, that I suddenly realized that many people were interested in what I had to say.

My Warholian fifteen minutes of fame came suddenly, and I began to think about the broad consequences of things I was writing on. So the writings on Islam, labor, logging and so forth (Jomo, Chang, and Khoo 2004) were all from a particular moment or context, with a view to struggles and debates in Malaysia and, to some extent, Indonesia, rather than the rest of the world. I suddenly found that there were interested audiences beyond Malaysia, and that’s when I started publishing out of London. And when I got frustrated with their growing reluctance to price the books more affordably, I began to publish in India. So, a lot of my career path was, as you can see, quite serendipitous. Hence, I’m not sure it really helps to think of my own personal history as being useful for anybody else.

What might be more relevant in my career is a longstanding skepticism about received knowledge. Perhaps more than anything else, this orientation has been essential to my learning and professional development, because a lot of what I have learnt from an early age was done through study groups, and not formal classes. That reminded me of the importance of non-formal education. Perhaps my own varied cultural background and experiences have also been important in reminding me about diverse sources of knowledge.

Prem: I would like to ask you a little bit more about the point you ended with about the diversity of your upbringing. This is a question about Malaysia. I am Malaysian as well. You ended by talking about the diversity of your upbringing. I imagine you grew up in a very different Penang from how it is now. I get a sense sometimes, not necessarily only from your writings but from other people from your generation, that there is a sense of a Malaysia that has increasingly become less possible, less viable, because of the intertwining of corporate interests, ethnic interests, and public policy. I suppose in a way, a very personal way, for me as well: is it possible to imagine a different politics and economics in Malaysia at this point?
Jomo: Although my aspirations have changed over time, I remain optimistic. I do not think it is useful to hark back to an old Malaysia which was once possible. You’re quite right, that possibility is no longer viable today. But at the same time, I am always pleasantly surprised by some unexpected new development and actually remain quite optimistic. I find that many young people, with whom I have had very little contact, are still raising questions, and this is very encouraging. I recently saw a computer geek talking about making much more information available online to expose the degree of corporate involvement in public policy making in Malaysia. I was very pleasantly surprised and moved to see that. At first, I wasn’t even sure the guy was Malaysian because he had a strange accent. I later realized that he had not learnt any English until a fairly advanced age, and that’s why he had an American accent. I’m not pessimistic about Malaysia, but I do realize that Malaysia is always changing, admittedly not always for the better, but there are new possibilities and understandings which are very important for us to appreciate, and to take things from there.

References


