



Binding militaries to democratic concepts: the role of civilian policymakers in Brazil and Chile

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ABSTRACT

In this article, we argue that civilian deference to the military in security policymaking is a key factor contributing to faulty threat assessment and declining military effectiveness. Civilian participation in defence policymaking is vital to operationalizing both governmental normative orientations and conceptual innovations in security thinking into the policy domain; in their absence, military-led policy documents eventually reflect the corporate interests of the military rather than a democratically defined national interest. We highlight the inadequacy of institutionalist accounts using recent literature on role conceptions, effectiveness and organizational learning. We probe our claim by examining two diverse cases from Latin America: Brazil and Chile. In Brazil, the civilian leadership relies on the military for threat assessment. The military is still beholden to a dated version of anticommunism and has focused on internal enemies, leading to inadequate doctrinal responses to external threats and diminished operational effectiveness. In Chile, on the other hand, civilians have succeeded in defining an updated, broader security agenda which has gradually become part of the military's self-understanding. This study advances the literature by conceptualizing a concrete mechanism of how civilian involvement in security policymaking safeguards military effectiveness, demonstrating that civilian control is beneficial to both sets of actors involved.

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New analytical tools have arisen as the study of civil–military relations (CMR) has moved past institutionalism and a focus on coups¹; one of the most promising focusses on the effectiveness of militaries as a complement to civilian control. Effectiveness can be defined as the ability of the armed forces to carry out the roles and missions they are assigned; in democracies those ends are defined by civilian policymakers.² In this article, we investigate the impact of civilian participation in defence policymaking on the effectiveness of militaries in two Latin American countries. The results demonstrate that civilian participation in defence policymaking is as beneficial to the military itself as it is to the quality of democratic oversight.

However, civilians may either abdicate or be denied their prescribed policy-setting role; studies from around the globe have documented the subsequent negative impacts

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on military effectiveness.³ Russian military failures in Ukraine have revived this debate, with observers pointing to authoritarian, “hypercentralized decisionmaking” and the absence of critical voices as crucial factors explaining the Moscow military’s unexpectedly poor performance.⁴

We propose a mechanism for assessing how civilian influence over military role conceptions, exercised through participation in the formulation of policy documents, influences military effectiveness. To do so, the article concatenates – and thereby leverages – key concepts from CMR, testing them based on a diverse-case study design using examples from Latin America.

The starting point is viewing civilian input into defence policymaking as a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for military effectiveness. Where civilians are decisively involved in policy formulation, they have been a conduit for the broadening and ultimately multiplication of militaries’ roles, reflecting the emergence of a broadened analytical concept of security and modern paradigms of democratic control. That concept of security, often focused on individual human beings alongside states, has its origins in the civilian political sphere, and goes beyond a narrower preoccupation with national defence which privileges action by the armed forces.

As a result, civilian input into policy, including threat assessments, is crucial to maintaining updated concepts that correspond to countries’ foreign policy and normative alignments. This in turn ultimately increases armed forces’ effectiveness by moving underlying security concepts beyond a restrictive focus on issues to which the armed forces are the response. When civilians take up their democratic oversight role, there is opportunity for these broader security conceptions to enter into defence policy. Where civilian input is absent, we argue, such a renewal will not take place, ultimately distancing militaries’ practice and self-view from broader policy concepts and societal values that are in constant democratic renewal.

The importance of civilian input lies in its effect on military role conceptions, understood as the “view, shared within one service or shared by all the services, regarding the proper purpose of the military organization and of military power in international relations”.⁵ Without sufficient civilian input, policy formulation and threat assessments undertaken by uniformed personnel – who tend to pursue a narrower role conception that perpetuates corporate interests by privileging the executive function of the military – defence policy can become outdated and distant from broader government political orientations, resulting in less effective military institutions. Put differently, effectiveness is greatest when the military works towards implementing broad goals defined by the civilians elected to lead them.

We probe the argument by comparing the cases of Brazil and Chile. In the former, the absence of determinant civilian input towards policy formulation, specifically threat perceptions, has allowed military role conceptions to remain relatively immune to significant change since the era of military rule. In Chile, by contrast, civilians have set several important parameters for threat perceptions, allowing for a greater degree of alignment and operational effectiveness. Civilian control is not ideal in Chile; however, the qualitatively stronger involvement of civilians in defence, especially security policy formulation, provides a positive impact on military effectiveness.

As noted, civilian involvement in policy formulation is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for military effectiveness. Civilians may not fully take up available roles in defence policymaking; however, if that opportunity is not even available, policy

decision-making can never be updated and thus rendered fully effective. Rather than offering a definitive conceptualization of military effectiveness,⁶ our contribution advances the extant literature by proposing and empirically tracing a mechanism that links civilian engagement to effectiveness, gauging the latter through preconditions essential to creating an effective military.

The article is divided into three sections. The first discusses the extant literature on effectiveness and civilians' proper role in democratic CMR, before laying out the argument. The second section presents our methodology and the empirical evidence. This is followed by a summary conclusion.

Effectiveness: aligning civilian-led policymaking and military role conceptions

Adding effectiveness to the study of CMR allows us both to move beyond a sole focus on control and to systematize a notoriously underspecified literature within CMR. Effectiveness is the capacity satisfactorily to carry out the roles assigned to the military (by civilians).⁷ It is therefore necessary that the foundations of those roles be injected into the policy formulation process at the appropriate junctures. The alignment of strategic concepts with military role conceptions is a crucial component of this process. We focus on the formulation of policy documents as a key locus for this dynamic.

Defining military effectiveness: linking military means to updated political ends

Thomas Bruneau, Aurel Croissant and Florina Matei pioneered the broadening of the CMR field beyond control to include military effectiveness. In democracies effectiveness is essentially achieved by matching the civilian-defined political ends of defence policy with the military's means to fulfil the ensuing roles and missions.⁸ Florina Matei's 2024 formulation of a framework for effectiveness is comprised of two main elements: strategic planning and strategic resources. We choose to focus here on strategic planning, as it fits best with our focus on discursive elements of the policy formulation process, which is a conscious choice to move away from centring on professionalism and institutions as does the second, resource-focussed branch of Matei's approach.

As laid out in Matei's conception, effective strategic planning is conceived of as a "methodical civil-military interagency process" that requires two elements centred on defence planning: robust strategic planning documents and an "interactive and iterative civil-military strategic decision-making process, where civilian ends meet security/military means".⁹

The second element of effective strategic planning, an "interactive and iterative civil-military decision-making process,"¹⁰ is where civilian influence comes to bear, through the updating of role conceptions and threat assessments. Therefore, a truly effective policy formulation process includes three categories of actors who interact in constant, repeated consultation: the elected civilian leadership, the security institutions, and civil society representatives. The latter ensure that "strategic planning is responsive to real security needs, and which overall strengthens the legitimacy of the process".¹¹

Role conceptions, threat perceptions and the policy formulation process

The iterative nature of this process—its ongoing adaptation to external shocks—ensures its responsiveness to democratically legitimated shifts in interests and thus ultimately its effectiveness. These civilian-defined ends are inevitably tied to—and in democracies are mirrored in—how the military conceives of its professional roles.¹² Role conceptions are defined by a multitude of factors including “history, culture, material resources, and recruitment considerations”.¹³ They mediate how the military implements its missions and tasks as well as how what the military does is “interpreted, lived, and made sense of”.¹⁴ Bruneau and Matei posit initially six and eventually 14 direct and supportive military roles ranging from traditional territorial defence to missions derived from more recent, human-centred conceptions of security.¹⁵

Role conceptions, shaped by civilian actors inside and crucially outside government, are the key conduit for the inclusion of new security conceptions in defence policy,¹⁶ and thus for its updating and continued effectiveness and legitimacy.¹⁷ Deborah Avant already recognized this over thirty years ago,¹⁸ and Michael Desch in 1999 identified interaction with civilians, including outside government, as the source of a broader, more representative view of national security.¹⁹ If left exclusively to soldiers, those in uniform often harbour a corporate interest in not expanding underlying security concepts beyond roles emphasizing the centrality of their own institutions rather than adopting a broader perspective on international politics and democratic deliberation. This can lead to threat assessments and policies that do not reflect updated democratic priorities.

Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas have argued that civilians’ absence from defence policy-making in Latin America is due to an “attention deficit”, partly explained by the lack of professional and political incentives to develop specialized knowledge.²⁰ While we broadly agree with this assessment on technical and operational issues, the same is not true regarding the security conceptions that inform threat assessments. Civil society institutions have been the crucial promoters of a “broadened” and “deepened” understanding of security from the 1980s and 1990s onward,²¹ and Latin America was no exception.²² The absence of civilian input in the defence policymaking process in Latin America is hence not simply a structural condition based on a putative lack of specialized knowledge, but a variable phenomenon that depends on multiple factors, including armed forces’ potential resistance, “civilian deference”, and “militarization by invitation”.²³

Regardless of the reasons for civilians’ absence in defence policymaking, their non-involvement at this crucial stage impacts negatively on the armed forces themselves – civilian oversight is fundamentally a mutually beneficial arrangement. The absence of effective oversight allows for prioritizing threats that match existing role conceptions determined by previous experiences rather than current geopolitical realities, lowering effectiveness.²⁴ War ceases to be the Clausewitzian continuation of politics by other means and becomes instead the perpetuation of the military’s corporate and institutional preferences, erroneously presented as synonymous with those of the state. From this follows that the convergence of security preferences between civilians and the military is necessary for sound strategic assessments. For convergence to occur, Croissant and Kuehn highlight that institutions must foment civil–military collaboration in the process of policy formulation, underscoring the role of assertive civilian presence to prevent that “the military’s myopic interests ... lead to self-serving

defence planning, institutions, and resource allocations and potentially crippling inter-service rivalries”.²⁵

Threat assessments constitute the key interface between civilian political responsibility and the specialized professional knowledge of the military. The subsequent formulation of policy documents is the foundation of democratic accountability in the defence realm. The civilian vision must prevail not only because excessive autonomy is a problem in itself, but more importantly, because the absence of civilian input prevents the entrance of updated normative or political preferences into defence policy.²⁶ Conversely, diverging preferences lead to competition, withholding information, and the promotion of incompetent but loyal officers, impeding sound strategy formulation, including threat recognition. Put succinctly, insufficient civil–military powersharing prevents coordination between politicians and uniformed leaders, generates poor policy, and hinders military effectiveness.

For the purpose of the present enquiry, the crucial inputs to the policy formulation process refer to a broadened notion of security. To capture the type of civilian input that guarantees up-to-date role conceptions and thus satisfactory civilian oversight *and* ultimately military effectiveness, it is necessary to distinguish between specialized knowledge of military affairs on the one hand, and a grasp of broadened conceptions of security on the other.

Civilians’ role in policymaking and military effectiveness in Brazil and Chile

The present analysis aims at establishing a chain in four steps (see [Figure 1](#)): from (1) civilian control over defence policy formulation as a crucial exercise to (2) defining predominant threats that inform the entire spectrum of the military’s activities and in doing so, (3) shaping military role conceptions to (4) achieving greater military effectiveness. Following from the theoretical underpinnings outlined in the previous section, in the absence of civilian input we expect the military to produce potentially outdated threat assessments that focus on itself as a solution, thus cultivating role conceptions disconnected from what civilians want the military to be able to do. Within this disconnect resides the seed of diminishing military effectiveness.

Methodology

To illustrate the mechanism through which civilian involvement in policy formulation influences military effectiveness, we use a confirmatory, diverse case study design with two qualitative case studies that represent variation in both the independent and the dependent variable. The independent variable, civilian involvement, is an essential




Figure 1. The causal impact of civilian deference on military effectiveness. Source: Authors’ elaboration.

part of civilian control to ensure compliance with civilian authority.²⁷ The dependent variable is military effectiveness. Although the two cases analysed in this study do not represent extremes, the variation between the cases is sufficiently pronounced to be able to demonstrate and contrast the causal processes at work in each. Brazil and Chile present numerous similarities with regard to their political, economic and social frameworks, particularly as regards the timeline of their transition from military dictatorship. However, over time they have developed significant variance in civilian participation in defence policy formulation. Chile has steadily increased the openness of its policy formulation process to civilians, while Brazil's doors have remained relatively closed to those not in uniform. In the latter this process has further been exacerbated by the militarization "by invitation" of the executive branch under the recent right-wing populist Bolsonaro government.²⁸ This explains at least in part, a similarly widening gap in the effectiveness of their militaries.

Civilian involvement in defence policymaking is operationalized here through two indicators: the actors who take part in the formulation of major policy documents and, through discourse analysis, the presence of civilian government preferences in policy texts. The second indicator assures that civilians' presence in those committees responsible for developing security and defence guidelines is not merely nominal or, as Pion-Berlin termed it, "transparent obfuscation".²⁹ It captures instead the power to define discourse as a constitutive practice, one that shapes how security is interpreted and talked about.³⁰

Discourse analysis allows us to capture the categories and terms in which security is being dealt with in the respective social, political and institutional context of each case.³¹ That is, the extent to which security is framed either in a traditional, military-centric way or in broader terms taking also the individual or communities as referent object. To this end, for each of the documents we identified different security concepts together with related concepts such as "defence cooperation" for human-based notions of security, or "deterrence" in relation to a conservative, military-centric security concept. In addition, we identified the corresponding threat or risk assessments as well as the role assigned to the military to meet the respective threat and how this was justified in the texts, e.g. for specific capacities, for the severity of threat, or other. The initial lists for each of the documents detailing security concepts, threats and role of the military, were synthesized in at least one more round of reading to condense the relevant interpretations of security and determine their relevance in the context of the document, i.e. whether it was presented as an issue on its own, in the context of the security/defence outlook the documents entail, or else. The final lists corresponding to the individual documents were subsequently compared for each of the cases to establish potential temporal variations and distil the main threads in relation to how security together with its main spoilers and beneficiaries was being portrayed. In a last step, we contrasted the results for each country.

The dependent variable is military effectiveness. Given the difficulty of empirically grasping this concept, scholars have identified conditions (rather than indicators) that are seen as necessary, if not sufficient preconditions for effectiveness.³² These revolve – with different emphases and sub-criteria – around the notions of strategy or effective strategic planning, institutions and resources. Strategy refers to the existence of a robust and agreed plan of how and why political objectives are to be met. Such strategic planning is reflected in relevant policy documents such as doctrine or national security strategies that define the role of the armed forces and hence provide guidance for the

military as to what it is expected to do. Institutions, which work based on regulations and bureaucratic procedures, are needed to implement the provisions defined in policy documents. Lastly, material and ideational resources ensure the military is able to do what it is asked.

Here, we focus empirical attention on effective strategic planning as a proxy for the potential to create an effective military by building on Matei's latest framework of effectiveness. This approach comprises two interconnected components; the first is the codification of strategy that defines the relevant context, priorities and time frames, and assigns specific goals and responsibilities.³³ The second component is an interactive and iterative strategic decision-making process including civilian leaders, relevant institutions and civil society.³⁴ Limiting the analysis to these two proxies of military effectiveness leaves aside the systematic and detailed consideration of other factors that are part of Matei's framework, namely institutions, assets and military corporateness, summarized under the header of resources. This curtailment of empirical breadth is justified by our interest in identifying a mechanism that translates civilians' involvement in security and defence policy making into concrete outcomes for military effectiveness. For the purpose of this study, focussing on strategic planning as an enabler of military effectiveness allows empirical depth and assessing the *quality* of the broader pattern of civil–military interaction on a day-to-day basis as a result of civilian involvement in the making of security and defence guidelines. Beyond the proxy of strategy, the case studies offer observations on the militaries' preparedness in terms of resources to carry out their assigned missions in order to offer a slightly more complete assessment of effectiveness.

The data was obtained from both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include mainly official security and defence policy documents, as well as commentary and other contributions from experts, defined as persons with privileged inside knowledge for their professional experience in the security and defence sector. Secondary sources comprise relevant studies in English, Portuguese and Spanish. The analysis was further complemented by our previous research on the two cases,³⁵ including interviews with both civilian and military personnel in the security and defence sectors on issues of control and role conceptions.

Brazil

Defence policy formulation in Brazil is a clear case of lacking civil society participation in defence policy formulation, as well as malalignment between civilian policy commitments and military preparation. In part, this is due to what Beliakova and Harig have respectively termed “civilian deference” and “militarization by demand”, where civilian policymakers themselves do not effectively take up the oversight tasks assigned to them by legislation.³⁶ The armed forces actively argue a putative lack of competence on defence and security issues within civilian society despite the existence of two proactive, diverse and sizeable national academic associations focussed on defence and security issues: the Brazilian Defence Studies Association (ABED) and the Brazilian International Relations Association (ABRI). Despite this, the armed forces claim a monopoly on defence knowledge, actively making use of this specious argument as a means of resisting real civilian oversight.³⁷

A primary obstacle is the fact that – with civilians' tacit assent – the Ministry of Defence, created only in 1999, does not fulfil the function ascribed to it by

institutionalist CMR theory. It remains staffed by a vast majority of active-duty and retired military officers;³⁸ additionally there are only limited mechanisms for consultations, which do not comprehensively include civil society despite this being explicitly called for in the 1988 Constitution and subsequent policy documents. Accordingly, civilian participation in policy formulation and planning regarding both documents and everyday implementation is severely limited. Simultaneously, a formal career path in government service for civilian defence experts, which would provide the normative counterweight called for by CMR theory³⁹ remains at the initial recruitment stage as of writing.

This allows the military not only to retain a monopoly over defence policy formulation, but to allege the absence of civilian expertise on the topic in the face of vibrant evidence to the contrary. This leads to a situation in which the chain of effects we posit above is largely borne out: in the face of almost non-existent civilian participation in the formulation of defence policy documents, military role conceptions are significantly outdated, and the country is left unprepared for missions derived from current broader, human-based visions of security. Authors affiliated to the Army have gone so far as to denature the argument regarding effectiveness to apply it to civilians, arguing the right to military autonomy from oversight where civilians are not effective by standards set by those in uniform. This runs directly counter to the notion that it is democratically legitimated civilians who set military conceptions, in accordance with elected government preferences and, increasingly, international expectations and standards.⁴⁰ This remains true despite civilians' abdication of this role under right-wing populist governments such as that of Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2022).

Civilian involvement in defence policymaking

The absence of civil society participation in defence policy formulation in Brazil has been, with the notable exception of a superficially more open process prior to the first Defence White Paper (2011), a constant since the restoration of democracy in 1988. Of the three main defence policy documents – the National Defence Policy, the National Defence Strategy (formally valid only in the uniformed sphere, but treated as applicable in civilian ambits by the military) and the White Paper on Defence – none has seen, in any of its iterations, significant input from civil society experts.⁴¹ The National Defence Policy, launched as the *Política de Defesa Nacional* in 1996 (before the creation of the Ministry of Defence) and revised in 2005 and 2020, lays out the basic worldview of Brazilian defence policy and ostensibly serves to aggregate the views of the relevant government instances. Notably, it lays out the National Defence Objectives whose implementation later falls to the National Defence Strategy (*Estratégia Nacional de Defesa*).

The elaboration of the National Defence Policy has from its inception occurred with minimal civilian participation, and virtually none from outside the executive branch. The working group created to formulate its first iteration in 1995 had 28 members; three were civilians, two of whom were academic experts included because they temporarily held posts in the executive.⁴² Today it is formulated entirely within the Armed Forces until the final round of the process, where representatives of civilian entities from the Executive Branch are consulted. There is little evidence of civil society participating, formally or informally, despite the explicit call to do so in National Defence Objective VI within the document itself.

The same is true for the first iteration of the National Defence Strategy, which as a Defence Ministry document is intended to be applied to the military ambit only but – as part of a larger militarization of ordinarily civilian ambits of governance – is routinely stretched to determine the limits and character of action by civilian actors as well. Its formulation occurred without civil society inputs within the Presidency’s Secretariat for Strategic Affairs (SAE). Though a committee involving representatives of civilian ministries was formed, its formulation was left to the Ministry of Defence, where it was structured largely by means of informal organization within the Army (with input from the Navy and Air Force). Even military researchers struggled to identify a systematic accounting of the uniformed actors involved.⁴³ Centred on the Army Command and Staff College (ECEME), the process was spearheaded by the academy’s then-commandant, Gen. Sergio Etchegoyen. An internal committee was formed within ECEME, again without input from civilians inside or outside the executive.

The composition of the consultative groups and interministerial groupings reinforces the idea that civilian deference is determinant: although the makeup of these committees is ultimately determined by the civilian president and defence minister, there has, with the exception of the 2011 White Paper, been no serious attempt to include civilian expertise from outside government or even within it. In this sense, in keeping with the process as outlined in the argument above, with the exception of the first White Paper, there have been no actors involved in the formulation process who can be expected to act as vectors of a modernized security concept that goes beyond an institutionally conservative state and military-centric vision.

The 2011 White Paper is a more performative document largely destined for foreign consumption, further intended to project domestically the idea that Brazil has an open consultation process and does not identify any of its neighbours as a threat.⁴⁴ The goal of elaborating a White Paper was enshrined in the same legislation that established the obligation of periodic updates of the country’s defence documents, to be sent to the legislative branch every four years.⁴⁵ The formulation process for the White Paper – a non-binding document considerably less influential than the previous two in determining military activity – included civilian representatives from the onset. The most prominent measure of civil society involvement resided in the fact that the Getúlio Vargas Foundation, an influential think tank, was brought in to co-organize its process; its coordination was headed by a military officer seconded there. A preliminary meeting included a significant number of academic experts, and inputs were sought through a series of workshops and seminars throughout the country. The results of the consultations were returned to the Ministry of Defence, where they were triaged and elaborated into the final document by a committee with minority civilian representation.⁴⁶ In future iterations of the National Defence Policy and Strategy, these patterns have been maintained, with a formulation process isolated from civil society and evincing scant participation in meaningful aspects of content production by non-members of the military.

Military role conceptions

As a result, those same policy documents, with the exception of roles related to participation in United Nations peace operations (for which there are separate corporate incentives for the armed forces, including increased autonomy from civilian oversight)⁴⁷ maintain threat perceptions and ultimately role conceptions that reflect the dominance of military corporate interests.

Donadelli et al. repeatedly underscore that the exclusion of civilian experts from the formulation process from these documents has had a profound effect on the roles which they perpetuate within the armed forces.⁴⁸ They point out the importance to democratization of bringing an expanded notion of the concept of the security to the process, while resisting the reverse process of the militarization of non-security issues as was the case under the Cold War National Security Doctrine which drove policy under military rule. This becomes particularly nefarious, in the eyes of these three eminent scholars of the South American defence and security landscape, in the case of the continued perseverance of missions against internal enemies:

To the extent that the origin of the formulation of the objectives lay in the supposed moral clairvoyance of a specific social sector and not in plural and open public debate, there was a fundamental incompatibility with the democratic order. In this sense, the DSN adapted to the logic of the East–West conflict the preexisting military role-beliefs that established for the armed forces a role as guarantors of social order. The spirit of the DSN, in particular the notion that the enemy is not necessarily foreign nor acts outside national borders, was expressed in the regulations of the Brazilian military government. Both the 1967 Constitution and the National Security Law of the same year include the comprehensive concept of security that is typical of this doctrine.⁴⁹

Another prominent analyst, who participated in early iterations of policy consultations subsequently referred to the resulting documents as “the Superior War College [where the Cold War National Security Doctrine that underpinned human rights violations and militarization of internal threats] with a dash of UN flavouring”.⁵⁰

The main thrust of the policy orientation remains on – strongly defensively oriented – warfighting capacity. Internal missions such as “guaranteeing law and order” – essentially a form of assisting domestic police forces in fighting crime – have taken on increased significance in practice, particularly in conjunction with experiences gathered in peace operations such as MINUSTAH.⁵¹

While the White Paper on Defence hesitates to designate concrete threats, and the various iterations of the National Defence Policy mention non-traditional roles (as portrayed by Bruneau) *en passant*, the new conception of roles that should accompany the adoption of these documents has not penetrated the military educational system. Particularly in the Army, soldiers are still taught that the Army predates the Brazilian state and serves the state rather than the government (or the people, through democratic mechanisms).

The Army Staff and Command College (ECEME) has not distanced itself from the flagrantly erroneous reading of Article 142 of the 1988 Constitution posited by jurist Ives Gandra, which posits a right to military intervention if – by the military’s own unsupervised judgment, for which no concrete criteria are given – democratic institutions are not “functioning”.⁵² This so-called “poder moderador” would effectively establish the armed forces as a *de facto* fourth branch of government and the final arbiter of Brazilian democracy.

Effectiveness

The absence of exposure to modernized security concepts and notions of civilian control has left the Brazilian armed forces in a state of reduced effectiveness as regards the alignment of its means and doctrines with the priorities identified by foreign policy and with broadened security concepts identified in civil society. In terms of effectiveness, the Brazilian armed forces have not yet overcome a *de facto*

focus on internal, putatively leftist, enemies. In terms of traditional territorial defence roles, for example, it has become commonplace to point to shortcomings in materiel, – whilst between 75 and 90 percent of the military budget goes towards (proportionately generous) salaries, bonuses and pensions.⁵³ The 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro, carried out by the military to assist with combatting organized crime and drug trafficking, failed to show demonstrable advantage to involving the armed forces.

Brazil's external security situation is essentially free of serious military threats, which is reflected in policy documents. Training exercises continue to retain a long-standing focus on internal threats, however. Even in today's post-dictatorship period, conceptualizations of internal enemies are often suffused with anti-progressive ideology, a leftover from the National Security Doctrine instilled and fomented by Cold War United States policy. As recently as 2021, special forces soldiers continue to train to fight internal enemies that invariably – despite claims from the institution that this is pure coincidence – consist of thinly veiled approximations of either current leftist movements or Communist movements which ceased to exist in the 1970s.⁵⁴ Under the Bolsonaro presidency, the armed forces became a key pillar of support for (occasionally extreme-) right-wing ideology, to the extent that the current leftist government led by Lula da Silva has identified these remnants – more easily countered through active civil society participation in defence policy formulation – as a significant problem.⁵⁵

In a result they ascribe firmly to the lack of civilian input, Donadelli et al. and others point out that from one version of the above listed policy documents to another, the language on internal missions becomes progressively more permissive, moving from “exceptionally” internal to “predominantly” internal.⁵⁶ One element pervasive to the policy documents which provides positive impulses in terms of civilian supremacy is the prevalence of diplomacy and international institutions as contributors to security both at home and worldwide – a clear benchmark of the participation of the Ministry of External Relations and its ability to imprint its own core values on the formulation process. The same impact is not accorded civil society or academics.

The effectiveness of the Brazilian military continues partially to fall prey to outdated role conceptions and a lack of civilian assertiveness in oversight. Professional military education continues to preach separation from (and moral superiority) to civilian life and decision-making processes while openly politicizing the armed forces. The culmination of this process to date lies in the complicity of numerous high-ranking general officers with the attacks of the 8th of January 2023 in Brasília, where right-wing insurgents attacked and severely damaged the headquarters of all three branches of the Brazilian federal government.⁵⁷ Increased civilian vigilance with regard to policy documents and role conceptions remains necessary in order to complete the long overdue process of instituting full civilian oversight over the Brazilian Armed Forces.

Chile

The Chilean military is an effective, well-resourced force. Defence spending remained stable around 2% of GDP from democratic consolidation until 2021, when it decreased to 1.6%. Several high-level fraud and corruption scandals during the past decade have prompted improvements in transparency and oversight. Civilians' influence on policy formulation has been gaining strength, and, gradual reforms have contributed to limiting military autonomy in operational planning. Overall, the armed forces are

considered professional and capable of carrying out their assigned tasks. These are codified in a series of planning documents agreed upon through broad engagement with different actors.

The level of military effectiveness is explained by the fact that CMR have slowly but steadily democratized after the end of the Pinochet dictatorship. As part of this process, civilians have gradually assumed greater influence on defence policy formulation. Their attempts at re-defining the military's role conceptions enjoyed some success, as they coincided with a reform process that became a core interest of the armed forces themselves. Specifically, a new class of officers saw value in withdrawing from domestic politics and instead responding to post-Cold War geo-political changes in order to safeguard their professionalism.

The negotiated process left several unresolved problems in the civil–military balance, but nevertheless resulted in increased internalization of broader security conceptualizations in the military.⁵⁸ Albeit inchoate notions of human security have come to co-exist with more traditional notions of security in the military. These broader conceptualizations have positioned the military well for performing a growing range of external and internal tasks.

Civilian involvement in defence policymaking

Dictatorship-era national security doctrine lingered well into Chile's return to democracy in 1990. Only after Pinochet disappeared from the political stage in 1998 did substantive steps towards democratic reform in the defence sector become possible, and even then progress was hindered by the authoritarian prerogatives the military had legally enshrined before leaving power.⁵⁹ Progressive civilian authorities sought to keep the military out of politics and move towards political reforms that would restrict their still ample privileges and competences.

In the context of global uncertainty no longer defined by bipolar competition, Chile looked to NATO for guidance on how to redefine the armed forces' role vis-à-vis society. Thus, in marked contrast to previous ideas enshrining the military as the most suitable and capable actor to define defence priorities, Juan Emilio Cheyre, Commander in Chief of the Army between 2002 and 2006 (later found guilty of human rights violations during the dictatorship) proposed that the army's War Academy should serve as a space for dialogue with civilians.⁶⁰ Cheyre had completed a doctoral degree in Madrid and remembered the Spanish military being applauded by the people for their role in peacekeeping, saying "I wanted the same for Chile, leaving the past behind and being useful" in responding to a changing international environment in which transnational threats, international collaboration and human security had become key motivations.⁶¹

The military's interest in self-preservation through modernizing reforms locked it into a broader process of redefining defence and security matters, including threat perceptions. While the military's assent to the reform process favoured increased effectiveness, it was not itself sufficient to explain this change without concomitant real civilian control over policymaking. As Barany notes: "[d]emocracy cannot be consolidated without military elites committed to democratic rule and obedient to democratically elected political elites. Good militaries are a necessary, if insufficient condition of democratization".⁶²

The elaboration of the Defence White Papers – book-length, non-binding documents that contain relevant definitions, a defence and security outlook as well as

some level of detail about the Ministry of the Defence, policymaking and the three service commands – is unanimously described as a trust-building process that brought the military and civilians in dialogue and to agree with at least some basic notions about defence.⁶³ As in Brazil, each revision was preceded by a series of preparatory seminars; in Chile, however, these were attended by academics and some civil society representatives, thus creating instances to discuss and reinforce positions on controversial matters. Although the military's input in all documents was sizeable, the guiding directives were increasingly set by civilians in the Ministry of Defence as the coordinating authority, a role that the military gradually accepted. As such, while the first documents were merely declaratory, in the past decade they acquired the character of political guidelines.

All documents take the state as a referent object. Yet, notably already in the 1997 White Paper, the interest of the state finds its limits in justice and human dignity. The 1997 paper does not mention human security, but the term is taken up from the 2002 publication onward. The 2017 White Paper states that “Chile subscribes to the human security approach”.⁶⁴ However, due to civilians' determination to keep the armed forces away from politics, all documents distinguish clearly between defence as a mostly outward-oriented activity and security, which concerns the domestic sphere. Since the latter is beyond the competence of defence, human security only finds an external application in armed conflict and international humanitarian law. In turn, its internal application and relevance remains underspecified beyond the fact that national security cannot overrule basic human rights.

As in Brazil, none of the documents elaborates specific threats. Only from the 2010 White Paper on, and based on a new definition of “threat” that requires some concrete cause of concern rather than a structural condition such as being a neighbouring country, a number of circumstances that could eventually constitute a threat are identified. The most recent Defence Strategy (2020) blurs the hitherto clear separation between external defence and internal security, highlighting asymmetric threats as an important element but failing to specify concrete preparatory scenarios.⁶⁵

Concerning the role of the military, the first two White Papers stipulated that the armed forces were the guarantors of the state's institutional order, echoing the Constitution which was reformed in 2005 to define the role of the military as contributing to the preservation of the institutional framework. The first White Paper saw defence as largely fomented by deterrence and national power, although it acknowledged the importance of diplomacy and other means.⁶⁶ From 2002 on, international cooperation acquired an increasingly important standing along with deterrence. Consequently, international cooperation is one of five main mission areas of the armed forces along with defence, humanitarian aid and disaster relief, civic action and territorial interests and security of the state.⁶⁷

The attempt at maintaining a strict separation between defence and security, despite the armed forces' growing internal deployment, had the paradoxical effect of so-called “new”/ “emerging” or “non-traditional threats” such as terrorism, drug trafficking, pandemics and the illegal drug trade receiving only superficial attention in the documents. While they are mentioned in all documents, only the 2010 White Paper began to specify that these were considered potential security threats, though beyond the competence of defence.⁶⁸ The same White Paper proposed changing defence planning from a threat-oriented process to one oriented towards capacities to respond to specific circumstances, an initiative that was never wholly implemented.

The uncomfortable co-existence of conventional and unconventional threats in sectors other than defence gave rise to an attempt to define a National Strategy of Security and Defence in 2012, a policy that proposed the term of “wider security” (*seguridad ampliada*) to incorporate a human security approach and establish multi-agent solutions to different conventional and non-conventional threats. However, the document was shelved as it sparked criticism that it would open the door to securitize a range of social and political problems and thus allow the armed forces into policymaking.⁶⁹

In sum, although the documents fail to establish and substantiate the human security agenda, they evidence important elements of wider conceptualizations of security having been injected into the policy-making process by civilians. These are the standing of human rights, a broader role for the armed forces than military defence against external actors, and a military self-understanding as one amongst several instruments to defend and obtain security for the state.

Military role conceptions

Despite the justified critique that Chile lacks a critical mass of civilian defence experts from which to recruit for the Ministry of Defence,⁷⁰ based on the above it is undeniable that civilians have left their mark on defence policymaking. This is especially true since the 2005 constitutional reform and, even more so, a 2010 law reforming the Ministry of Defence. Although the Ministry has maintained a high level of active and retired military personnel, it has also had to implement directives from the Ministry of External Affairs, which since democratization has exhibited a stable foreign policy orientation aimed at consolidating Chile’s image as a human rights promoter.

Observers agree that human rights considerations have been systematically – if not always consistently – brought into the defence decision-making process.⁷¹ Chile was the first Latin American country to become part of the Human Security Network, a group of states whose diplomats promote the concept by coordinating mainly with the UN and civil society organizations.⁷² The Ministry’s “Foreign Policy of Chile 2030” directive maintains that international security will be characterized by transnational threats and intrastate conflict more than by interstate conflict, and that it will feature a plethora of non-state actors in defining roles.

Following this line, the military moved from preparing for conflict with its neighbours and against “internal enemies”/communism to operating a broader and more abstract threat scenario. Conflict scenarios with the neighbouring countries never ceased to influence military and defence planning, especially with regards to Bolivia, which holds that there is a pending territorial issue. Nevertheless, the terms in which these issues are discussed have changed with the White Papers increasingly emphasizing the need for confidence and trust building. A series of cooperation initiatives have facilitated closer relations with Argentina and, to a lesser extent Peru. Even if the call for international cooperation as an instrument of defence has only led to shallow integration in Latin America, at the discursive level in Chile it has come to stand on a par with the call for deterrence, as reflected in Chile’s Defence White Papers (1997, 2002, 2010, 2017) and one National Defence Policy (2020), which is being updated at the time of writing.

There is some room to question to what extent these political directives are internalized and applied in the armed forces. The Ministry of Defence’s Division of the Armed Forces lacks the resources to maintain an adequate level of oversight, leaving

the individual branches considerable room to define professional education curricula beyond strictly defence and military-related matters, including political science, psychology and ethics. Most often, these subjects are taught by retired officers. Yet, pressures to compete for recruits and to have study programmes accredited by the Ministry of Education ensure some limitations to military autonomy concerning education.

In practice, according to Solar, four axes of defence policymaking anchored the Chilean armed forces squarely in the human security approach: peacekeeping operations, disarmament (particularly domestic mine clearance), humanitarian assistance, as well as the enforcement of human, social and economic rights.⁷³ Although these missions co-exist with what continues to be identified as the primordial role in the military – to preserve national sovereignty and territorial integrity against external threats – they have ensured that the notions of international cooperation, trust-building and civil–military engagement are part of the day-to-day military vocabulary.

In a country prone to earthquakes and wildfire, domestic humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions in particular, have come to constitute an important part of the military's role conception and its positive image in Chilean society. In an ironic twist, although these and other internal missions are mandated by civilians, it is possible to identify a degree of deference among civilian decisionmakers as they deploy the armed forces as a putatively readily available solution while not providing for commensurate civilian capacities. This undermines democratic governance in the medium and long term.⁷⁴ Apart from their regular and prominent participation in disaster response – where there is no identifiable enemy –, under a state of constitutional exception, the military has been called upon to respond to social unrest and control a conflict with indigenous Mapuche groups in the south of the country. Since 2019 new legislation has further enabled the military to assist the security forces in border control, combatting organized crime and the protection of critical infrastructure. The military has hesitantly embraced these tasks cautious to comply with the relevant regulations to avoid falling out of favour with the public as it happened with the “unprecedented crisis” caused by the fraud and corruption cases in the Army.⁷⁵ At least until now, these internal missions have therefore served as reminder to the armed forces of the importance of keeping a human security perspective in terms of human rights. Given the relatively recent proliferation of internal missions, however, their impact on military role conceptions remains to be seen.

Effectiveness

The Chilean armed forces are considered professional and capable of carrying out their assigned tasks, be it in UN or European Union peace operations or exercises with NATO forces. The military is seen as prepared for armed conflict with its neighbours, although its predominant role – at times distracting from effectively preparing for national defence – has been supporting the state in disaster relief, community development and domestic order and security. Civilian authorities report that the military has collaborated in these tasks in an effective way complying with all relevant requirements, notwithstanding the fact that interagency coordination and capacity development at the systemic level – issues beyond the purview of the institution itself – present significant challenges.

The relevant precondition for effectiveness analysed in this study is strategic planning, which is comparatively well-developed in Chile. Although the country lacks a comprehensive strategy on security and defence, its periodically elaborated White

Papers and the National Defence Policy largely reflect the country's political aspirations.⁷⁶ The processes of elaborating these documents have been lengthy, involving consultations with the legislative branch, the security and defence institutions, and academics as representatives of civil society. These negotiations have been a part of all major reforms in military and defence policy since democratization, where finding consensus with the military was seen not only as necessary but also desirable by successive governments.⁷⁷

In terms of financial resources and asset development, the Chilean military is a notable case as it has benefited from continuous budget provisions. From the 1960s on the armed forces received a fixed percentage (10%) of the revenue from copper exports of Chile's state-owned company *Codelco*. The state was obliged to provide for a minimum annual floor when the international copper price dropped. This fund was replaced in 2019 by other, democratic and transparent mechanisms that ensure continuous, pluriannual investments in strategic capabilities, especially for warfare. As a result, Chile is widely seen as having "the most modern air force, army, and navy in Latin America" to fulfil the tasks defined by civilian authorities.⁷⁸

Conclusions

Despite growing academic interest in the armed forces beyond the cardinal question of ensuring civilian oversight, our understanding of how it impacts military effectiveness remains underspecified. This article presents a mechanism to explain how the absence of civilians in policy formulation leads to outdated military role conceptions which keep the military clinging to obsolete threat analyses, thus creating a distance between civilian and military policy goals which lowers military effectiveness. The analysis supports the argument based on the cases of Brazil and Chile. In the latter, a broader conception of security and a modernized notion of civilian supremacy promoted by civilians allowed for a military better prepared to effectively confront a range of different tasks. In stark contrast, in Brazil – where civilian participation is fleeting and shallow at best despite ample available expertise – ideologically shaded internal missions have persisted forty years beyond the reinstatement of democratic governance and over twenty years past the first arrival of a left-wing government in power. This has left the Brazilian armed forces with an effectiveness deficit with regard to both relative preparedness for their main, external mission as well as the aptitude of their training for actually present threats in the domestic arena.

For the Latin American context, the article demonstrates the crucial role of civilian control for military effectiveness even if historical, structural and rational reasons have resulted in civilian inattention to defence matters.⁷⁹ Beyond more specialized knowledge on technical and operational matters, civilians' general comprehension of security is crucial to ensuring that defence functions according to the same parameters of effectiveness as other public policies.

Considering the prevailing "no coup, no problem" mentality in the region,⁸⁰ the argument presented here sheds a rather pessimistic light on security and defence policy in Latin America where civilians have in recent years not only postponed necessary reforms in military education, justice, parliamentary oversight and other crucial areas, but also risked politicizing the military through an increasing list of internal tasks and missions the armed forces are asked to perform.⁸¹ Such a trend

augurs badly not only for democratic CMR but also for military effectiveness if civilians fail to exert a decisive impact on military role conceptions through policy formulation. Even in the case of Chile, a comparably successful case in which civilian control over policy formulation has been relatively high, thus ensuring an effective military overall, there remain gaps in civilian control that have prevented a more effective and efficient management of defence assets.⁸²

Notes

1. Kühn and Trinkunas, “Conditions of military contestation”.
2. Matei, “Strategic Planning, Resources, Effectiveness”, 123–4; Bruneau and Croissant, “Civil-Military Relations”.
3. Barany, *Armies of Arabia*; Talmadge, *The Dictator’s Army*.
4. Barany, “Armies and Autocrats”, 80.
5. Harig, Jenne, and Ruffa, “Operational Experiences”; Vennesson et al., “European Way of War?” 630.
6. For more on this see Matei, “Strategic Planning, Resources, Effectiveness”.
7. Matei, Halladay, and Bruneau, *Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, 4; Pion-Berlin and Martínez, *Soldiers, Politicians, and Civilians*, 33; Bruneau and Croissant, “Civil-Military Relations”, 3.
8. Matei, “Strategic Planning, Resources, Effectiveness”, 123–4; Bruneau and Croissant, “Civil-Military Relations”.
9. Matei, “Strategic Planning, Resources, Effectiveness”, 126–7.
10. *Ibid.*, 128.
11. *Ibid.*, 129.
12. Pion-Berlin and Martínez, *Soldiers, Politicians, and Civilians*; Bruneau and Croissant, “Civil-Military Relations”; Matei et al., *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*.
13. Harig, Jenne, and Ruffa, “Operational Experiences”, 4.
14. *Ibid.*, 12.
15. Bruneau and Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization”; Matei et al., *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*.
16. Pion-Berlin, “Political Management of the Military”, 1.
17. Wilén and Strömbom, “A Versatile Organisation”; Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, “Attention Deficits”.
18. Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change*.
19. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military*.
20. Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, “Attention Deficits”; Duarte Villa and Jenne, “By All Necessary Means?”; Pion-Berlin and Martínez, *Soldiers, Politicians, and Civilians*.
21. Buzan and Hansen, *Evolution of International Security Studies*; Krause and Williams, “Agenda of Security Studies”.
22. Tickner and Herz, “No Place for Theory?” 92.
23. Beliakova, “Erosion by Deference”; Jenne and Martínez, “Domestic Military Missions in Latin America”, 2022.
24. Harig, Jenne, and Ruffa, “Operational Experiences”; Brooks and Erickson, “The Sources of Military Dissent”.
25. Croissant and Kuehn, “Introduction”, 9; see further Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster, “The Second Generation Problematic”, 37–38; Reiter and Stam, *Democracies at War*.
26. Bruneau, “Civil-Military Relations in Latin America”, footnote 27.
27. Bruneau and Croissant, “Civil-Military Relations”; Pion-Berlin and Martínez, *Soldiers, Politicians, and Civilians*.
28. Bauer et al., “Bureaucratic Militarization as a Mode of Democratic”.
29. Pion-Berlin, “Political Management of the Military”, 30.
30. This follows the approach of critical discourse analysis as developed by Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis*.
31. Keller, *Doing Discourse Research*.

32. Bruneau and Croissant, *Civil-Military Relations*; Bruneau and Matei, "Towards a New Conceptualization"; Bruneau and Matei, *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*; Croissant and Kuehn, "Introduction".
33. Matei, "Strategic Planning, Resources, Effectiveness", 127–28.
34. *Ibid.*, 128–30; see also Pion-Berlin and Martínez, *Soldiers, Politicians, and Civilians*.
35. Jenne, Nicole & Amigo, Alejandro: The military culture of Chile. In: Biehl, Heiko, Graf, Timo & Rotzer, Simon: *Military Cultures of Liberal Democracies*. Forthcoming 2027.
Jenne, Nicole. "Civilianizing the armed forces? Peacekeeping, a traditional mission for the armed forces" In: *Defence Studies* 20, 2020, pp. 105–122.
36. Beliakova, "Erosion by Deference"; Harig, "Militarisation by Popular Demand?".
37. Jenne and Martínez, "Domestic Military Missions in Latin America".
38. Oliveira, Kalil, and Tubino, "A (Re)Militarização Do Ministério Da Defesa"; Brazil, "Request for Information".
39. Kenkel, "Language Matters".
40. Bruneau and Croissant, "Civil-Military Relations", 3–5.
41. Brazil, "Política de Defesa Nacional"; Brazil, "Política de Defesa Nacional"; Brazil, "Estratégia Nacional de Defesa"; Brazil, "Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional"; Brazil, "Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional"; Brazil, "Política de Defesa Nacional"; Brazil, "Estratégia Nacional de Defesa". See also Duarte, "Expecting the Next Coup".
42. Gröhs, "Mecanismos para formulação da Política de Defesa brasileira", 64.
43. *Ibid.*, 69.
44. Brazil, "Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional".
45. Brazil, "Lei Complementar N° 136 de 25/08/2010".
46. Gröhs, "Mecanismos para formulação da Política de Defesa brasileira", 74–88.
47. Kenkel, "Brazil"; Kenkel, "Stability Abroad, Instability at Home?".
48. Donadelli, Saint-Pierre, and Vitelli, "Os Documentos de Defesa Do Brasil".
49. *Ibid.*, 145 (authors' translation).
50. Oliveira, "A Estratégia Nacional de Defesa", 75.
51. Harig, "Officers' Role in Government Taint the Military Institution?"; Müller and Steinke, "The Geopolitics of Brazilian Peacekeeping"; Pingeot, "Peace Operations as International Practices".
52. Gandra, "Cabe Às Forças Armadas Moderar".
53. <https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/blogs/fernando-nakagawa/economia/macroeconomia/gasto-militar-com-pessoal-no-brasil-e-proporcionalmente-mais-que-o-triplo-dos-eua/>.
54. UOL, "Exército diz que simulação"; <https://sintrajufe.org.br/organizacoes-ficticias-de-esquerda-foram-alvo-de-treinamento-militar-apontam-documentos-divulgados-pelo-the-intercept/>
55. See note 33 above.
56. Donadelli, Saint-Pierre, and Vitelli, "Os Documentos de Defesa Do Brasil"; Aguilar and Mendonça, "Brasil e Forças Armadas", 174–9.
57. On 11 September 2025, the Federal Supreme Court (STF) sentenced ex-President Bolsonaro and four general officers to extensive prison terms for *inter alia* participating in the attempted overthrow of democratic institutions.
58. Robledo, "Relaciones Cívico-Militares En Chile"; Varas, "Seguridad Nacional".
59. Agüero and Fuentes, *Influencias y resistencias*.
60. Seguel Rojas, "Un Ejército Para La Paz", 229.
61. Cheyre, Interview by Nicole Jenne.
62. Barany, *Soldier and the Changing State*, 3.
63. Álvarez and Gómez, "Fuerzas Armadas En Orden Interno"; Faundes, "Evolución Del Concepto Seguridad", 194–5.
64. Chile, "Libro de La Defensa Nacional de Chile 2017", 101.
65. Chile, "Política de Defensa Nacional de Chile 2020".
66. Chile, "Libro de La Defensa Nacional de Chile 1997", 75.
67. Chile, "Libro de La Defensa Nacional de Chile 2017".
68. Chile, "Libro de La Defensa Nacional de Chile 2010", 130.
69. Varas, "Seguridad Nacional"; Solar, "Governance of Defense and Policymaking".
70. See note 12 above.
71. Fuentes-Julio, "Norm Entrepreneurs in Foreign Policy"; Baeza Freer and Wehner, "Los Desafíos de Seguridad Para Chile".

72. Ibid.
73. Solar, *Governing the Military*.
74. Álvarez and Gómez, “Fuerzas Armadas En Orden Interno”; Jenne and Martínez, “Domestic Military Missions in Latin America”.
75. The Clinic, *Milicogate*.
76. Bruneau, *Military Effectiveness*, 25.
77. For details see Baeza Freer and Escudero, “Fuerzas Armadas Semiautónomas En Chile”; Robledo, ‘Democratic Consolidation in Chilean Civil-Military Relations: 1990–2005’; Robledo, “Relaciones Cívico-Militares En Chile”.
78. Bruneau, *Military Effectiveness*.
79. Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, “Attention Deficits”.
80. Pion-Berlin and Martínez, *Soldiers, Politicians, and Civilians*, 2.
81. Mani, “Democratic Resilience and the Military in New Democracies”.
82. Contreras and Salazar, “Desconstitucionalizar Para Democratizar”; Robledo, “Relaciones Cívico-Militares En Chile”; Varas, “Autonomía corporativa, inmuebles y Fuerzas Armadas”; Yopo, “Una nueva Política de Defensa para el siglo XXI”.

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